RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LABOR RELATIONS: STANDARDS
ESTABLISHED FOR ISSUANCE OF
BARGAINING ORDERS BASED ON
AUTHORIZATION CARDS
n NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,' the United States Supreme
Court held that elections were not the sole means of authorizing
unions as bargaining representatives and that unambiguous
authorization cards are reliable indicat6rs of employee sentiment
unless union solicitors indicate that the cards will be used only to
obtain an NLRB eleption. The Court also held that the "good faith
doubt" test is no longer applicable in determining whether a
bargaining order should issue to compel an employer to recognize a
union that claims representative status based upon authorization
cards signed by a majority of the employees. Rather, the Court
held that the commission of "serious unfair labor practices" that
"tend to preclude the holding of a fair election" will justify the
issuance of a bargaining order. 2 In each of the four cases
consolidated here,3 employers had refused to bargain on the
grounds that authorization cards signed by a majority of the
employees were inherently unreliable indicators of the employees'
sentiments, and that, therefore, the union had no basis to demand
recognition. In each case, unfair labor practice charges filed by the
-union resulted in either preventing an NLRB election or setting
aside an election already won by the employer. The NLRB had
issued an order to bargain in each case after finding that the
employers entertained no good faith doubt of the union's majority status.4 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit enforced
'395 U.S. 575 (1969).
at 600. The Court also rejected an employer's claim that restrictions in the Act
violated his freedom of speech. Id. at 616-20.
General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB. 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's,
Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.
1968); Sinclair Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
2 Id.

Heck's, Inc., 65 L.R.R.M. 1635 (N.L.R.B. 1967), enforcement granted in part and
denied in part per curian,, 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); Sinclair Co., 65 L.R.R.M. 1087

(N.L.R.B. 1967), enJbrced. 397 F.2d 157 (Ist Cir. 1968); Gissel Packing Co., 157 N.L.R.B.
1065 (1966). enJorcentent granted in part and denied in part per curiant. 398 F.2d 336 (4th
Cir. 1968); General Steel Products, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 636 (1966), enjorcentent granted in
part and denied in part per curiain, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968).
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this order in NLRB v. Sinclair Co.,5 but the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied enforcement in the other
three cases. Enforcement was denied on the ground that an election

constitutes the only valid basis for finding an obligation to bargain
on the employer's part unless the employer knew, by some

means other than the cards themselves, that a majority of the
employees favored the union.' Further, the Fourth Circuit held in
two cases that the cards were such inherently unreliable indicators

of employee opinions that distrust of them could serve as the basis
of an employer's good. faith doubt of the union's majority.!
Upholding the bargaining orders, the Supreme Court affirmed the

First Circuit but reversed the Fourth Circuit.
It is not entirely clear that Congress intended to permit

employees to designate bargaining representatives by any means
other than an NLRB election or that a bargaining order might
issue where an election had not been held. Section 9(c) of the

original National Labor Relations Act stated that the Board could
use elections or "any other suitable method" of certifying a union.'
The 1947 amendments, however, deleted the phrase "any other
suitable method," ' and allowed an employer to petition for an
election after being presented with a bargaining demand.' 0
Committee reports on the 1947 bill also indicated that the employer
was assured of the right to petition for an election subsequent to a

recognition demand." Most circuits, noting that certification of the
union is not a prerequisite for an employer's duty to bargain,'2 have
3 397 F.2d 157 (Ist Cir. 1968).
' General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB. 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's,
Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.
1968).
NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398
F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968).
'National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935), as antended, 29
U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
1 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964),formerly ch. 372, § 9(c),
49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935).
j

Id.

"S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, 25 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. 35 (1947).
S12 Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
with the "representative of his employees" as designated subject to section 9(a). Section 9(a)
states that representatives "designated or selected" by a majority of the employees shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees. At no point does the Act state that the
union must be certified for section 8(a)(5) to come into operation. Labor Management
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held that employees may designate their representatives by means

other than an election.1 3 In these circuits, almost any means of
showing majority support for a union is acceptable, including

participation in strikes, 4 picketing,'5 and authorization cards. 6 In

most circumstances,' 7 once a majority of the employees designates a
bargaining agent by any of these means, it is an unfair labor

practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with that

representative,"8 and pursuant to section 10(c) the Board may order

an employer to cease and desist from this unfair labor practice. 9
The Fourth Circuit, however, has held that because of the 1947
amendments an election is the only basis for an employer's duty to
bargain, 2° but it has noted a possible exception where "outrageous"
unfair labor practices have made a fair election impossible,' Gissel

presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve this
conflict among the circuits as to what effect Congress intended the
amendments to have on the issuance of bargaining orders where no
valid election has been held.

The circuit courts have differed on the reliability of
authorization cards and on the circumstances which will justify
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) & 159(a) (1964),fornerly ch" 372, §§ 8(5) & 9(a), 49
Stat. 449 (1935); NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., 386 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1967)
(Sobeloff, J.. concurring).
" E.g.. NLRB v. Tom's Supermarket, Inc., 385 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1967); NLRB v.
Decker, 296 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1961).
",E.g., Lebanon Steel Foundry v. NLRB, 130 F.2d 404, 407 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 317
U.S. 659 (1942). See also Century Mills, Inc., 5 N.L.R.B. 807 (1938).
"E.g., NLRB v. World Carpets, Inc., 403 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1968).
26 E.g., United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 69 (1956);
Franks Brothers Co. v. NLRB. 137 F.2d 989 (1st Cir.), a~ffd, 321 U.S. 702 (1943).
"7See notes 24-36 infra and accompanying text, dealing with exceptions where an employer
has a good faith doubt of the union's majority or where the union's majority is obtained
through improper means.
11E.g.. NLRB v. George Groh & Sons, 329 F.2d 265, 268-69 (10th Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1940). Further, if the employer has
committed unfair labor practices, a bargaining order may be granted even though no union
request, and thus no refusal, to bargain has been made. J.C. Penney Co. v. NLRB. 384 F.2d
479, 485-86 (10th Cir. 1967); Western Aluminum of Oregon, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1191
(1963).
11Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964),formerly ch. 372, § 10(c), 49
Stat. 449 (1935).
0See N LRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967); note 6 supra. The
Supreme Court rejected this approach in United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring
Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
23 NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 568-70 (4th Cir. 1967).
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issuance of a bargaining order. While most circuits regard
authorization cards as sufficiently reliable to serve as a basis for an

employer's bargaining obligation, the Fourth Circuit has held that
the cards are so inherently unreliable that an employer may in good
faith refuse to bargain on the strength of them. 2 The reasons which

courts give for this position include the group pressures on the
employee to sign a card, the fact that the employer's side is not

usually presented as it would be in an election campaign, and the
possibilities of coercion and misrepresentation by the union's
solicitor..2 3 To prevent union misrepresentation from restricting
employees' free choice, the Board held in Cumberland Shoe Corp.2'
that the card would be invalidated if the union solicitor represented
that the card would be used solely to obtain an NLRB election.
This requirement was rigidly construed so as to uphold cards

which, although giving the impression that an election would be
held, did not explicitly state that the cards would only be used to

obtain an election. 25 Several circuits have refused to follow
Cumberland Shoe, and some of the circuits accepting the rule have
been critical of the Board's rigid application of it. 21 On the related

question of the circumstances under which a bargaining order may
issue, the Board held in Joy Silk Mills, Inc. 27 that an employer will

not be compelled to bargain if his refusal of the union's recognition
demand was made because of a good faith doubt that the union

enjoyed majority support among the employees. An employer could
not hope to successfully plead good faith doubt if he committed
unfair labor practices subsequent to his refusal to bargain2 ' Joy
Silk and subsequent cases placed on the employer the duty to show
'2 Id.: NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co.. 386 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967). Other circuits share
this view: NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967): Engineers & Fabricators,
Inc. v. NLRB. 376 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1967).
2 NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967). See also Comment,
Union .-Ittthori-ation Cards. 75 YALE L.J. 805, 823-28 (1966).
2 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), enbrced, 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965).
Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 862 (1964), enjbrced, 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir.
1966). .See also 75 YALE L.J.. supra note 23, at 824-25.
-'See note 22 supra and accompanying text. For criticism or the doctrine, see, e.g., NLRB
v. Sand%', Stores. Inc.. 398 F.2d 268 (Ist Cir. 1968), NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc.,
384 I-.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1967): 75 YALE L.J.. supra note 23. at 824-26.
285 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949). entlorced. 185 F.2d 732 ().C. Cir. 1950). cert. denled, 341
U.S. 914 (1951).
-Id. See Comment, I'mployer "Good IPtith
Donthi." 116 U. PA. L. RI v. 709. 715-16
(1968).
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good faith reasons for his refusal to bargain.2 This duty has been
shifted to the General Counsel, and an employer need not give
reasons for his doubt. 0 But if the employer did give some reason

other than doubt of the union's majority, such as an erroneous
belief by the employer that he was not engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the NLRA, most circuits found a violation of
section 8(a)(5) even though the reason was advanced in good faithY
Good faith doubt could be established in the Fourth Circuit,

however, by merely expressing a general distrust of the reliability of
authorization cards3 2 In several circuits an employer's refusal to
accept the findings of a disinterested third party that the cards were
valid was originally held to be evidence of a lack of good faith
doubt.3 Subsequent cases have, however, declined to infer bad faith
from such a refusal. 34 Almost any unfair labor practice was
sufficient, at one time, to call forth a bargaining order,:3 but more

recently only those tending to undermine the union's majority and
thus interfere with the election processes have been held to justify a

bargaining order3 In oral argument of Gissel before the Supreme
Court, the NLRB indicated its latest position to be that good faith
doubt is irrelevant and that a bargaining order will issue where
unfair labor practices are committed which tend to preclude the
" Kellogg Mills, 147 N.L.R.B. 342 (1964), enjorced, 347 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1965); Snow &
Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced. 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962); Joy Silk Mills, Inc.
85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced. 185 F.2d 732 ([D.C. Cir. 1950). cert. denied. 341 U.S.
914 (1951).Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
' H & W Construction Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 852 (1966); Gordon, Union Authorization
Cards and the Duty to Bargain. 19 LABOR L.J. 201. 208 (1968): But see Sonora Sundry
Sales, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 676 (1966). enlorceinent denied. 399 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1968).
562 (4th Cir. 1967).
1 NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co.. 386 I-.2d
3 E.g., NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc., 354 F.2d 926 (Ist Cir. 1965); NLRB v. George
Groh & Sons, 329 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1964): Sno%% & Sons. 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961).
enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
3 Textile Workers Union of \merica v. \I.RB. 386 1 .2d 790 (2d Cir. 1967): Aaron
Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966); Strydel, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966): People's
Serv. Drug. Stores, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1516 (1965), enforcement denied. 375 F.2d 551 (6th
Cir. 1967).
2 Snow & Sons, 134 N.I..R.B. 709 (1961). en/brced. 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962); see
Comment, The Authori:ation Card Dilemma. 13 \,i.I.. L. Ri:%. 564. 575 (1968): 75 YAI.I:
L.J., supra note 23.
u People's Serv. Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1967); Aaron Bros.,
158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966): Hammond & Irving. Inc.. 154 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1965); Comment.
Union Authorization Cards: A Reliable Basis for an NLR B Order to Bargain?47 TEXAS L.
REV. 87 (1968).
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holding of a fair election3 7 However, the Board contended that if
the employer either had knowledge from some source other than
the cards themselves that the union had majority backing or if the
employer in refusing to bargain gave some reason other than doubt
of majority support, the employer's refusal to bargain would still
be a violation of section 8(a)(5)8 Thus, the trend has been away
from a rigid application of the good faith doubt test. It was upon
this disagreement over the inherent unreliability of authorization
cards and the situations in which a bargaining order is appropriate
that the Supreme Court rendered the Gissel decision.
The first portion of the Court's holding dealt with the employers'
claims that elections are the sole source of an employer's bargaining
duty, and that authorization cards are inherently unreliable.
The Court held that Congress did not intend to restrict an employer's duty to bargain only to those situations where an election has been held, in enacting the 1947 amendments. Further,
the Court held that authorization cards Were sufficiently reliable to
serve as the basis for a bargaining order. The opinion noted that
cards may be the most effective way of assuring employee free
choice when the employer has committed unfair labor practices
which disrupt the election process. 9 Rejecting the employer's
argument that the employees could not make an informed choice
without an election because the employer had no chance to present
his side of the argument, the Court stated that employers usually
do learn of the organization drive early enough to express their
views' To the employers' claim that group pressures often cause
an employee to sign a card even though he may not favor the
union, the Court replied that the same pressures would likely be
present in an election." The Court also found employee free choice to
be adequately insured by the Board's Cumberland Shoe doctrine."
Expressly restricting its opinion to unambiguous cards, 3 the Court
indicated that employees should be held responsible for what they
395 U.S. at 594.

Id. For examples of reasons, other than good faith doubt of the union's majority status,
which employers have given in refusing to bargain, see note 31 supra and accompanying text.
31395 U.S. at 602.
ID Id. at 603.
11Id. at 603-04.
2'Id. at 606. See note 24 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the Board's
Cumberland Shoe doctrine.
395 U.S. at 609.
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sign unless the solicitor's statements induce them to ignore the language above their signatures. The opinion warned, however, that
an overly rigid application of the Cumberland Shoe doctrine is unacceptable and stated that the approach taken in General Steel Products, Inc. " is the most rigid that the Court will accept! 5

In the second portion of its holding, the Court announced the
new test for determining when a bargaining order should issue:
If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices
and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional
remedies, though present, is slight and that employee sentiment once
expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a
bargaining order, then such an order should issue....

The Court emphasized that not every unfair labor practice has a
sufficient impact on the election process to justify a bargaining
order 7 and noted the Fourth Circuit's indication that a bargaining
order might be issued where "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair
labor practices had such serious effects on employee choice that less
drastic remedies could not make a fair election possible.48 The only
effect of Gissel, the Supreme Court said, will be to permit a

bargaining order to issue in "less extraordinary cases" marked by
"less pervasive practices" which still tend to interfere with the

election process.49
The Gissel opinion weighs the relative merits of authorization
cards and NLRB elections as bases of an employer's obligation to
bargain. While the cards are to be permitted in some situations, the

balance is clearly in favor of elections." The opinion focuses on
" 157 N.L.R.B. 636 (1968).
15395 U.S. at 607-09. In this case, 97 cards were validated even though one or more of the
following statements were made to the signers: that the cards would be used to get an
election; that the signer could vote either for or against the union even though he had signed
a card; and that the card would be kept secret and would be shown only to the NLRB for the
purpose of obtaining an election.
11395 U.S. at 614-15.
Id. at 615.

"Id. at 613-14. The Court's Fourth Circuit reference was to NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing
Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967).
"395 U.S. at 614.
See note 45 supra and accompanying text. In six cases since Gissel. the Board has used
the Gissel test: Texaco, Inc.. 72 L.R.R.M. 1146 (N.L.R.B. 1969); Garland Knitting Mills, 72
L.R.R.M. 1112 (N.L.R.B. 1969); Marie Phillips, Inc., 72 L.R.R.M. 1103 (N.L.R.B. 1969);
Snyder Tank Corp., 71 L.R.R.M. 1615 (N.L.R.B. 1969); Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 71
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effectuation of employee free choice as the central goal and
concludes that an election can best reflect that choice. This is

essentially the approach taken by the Board in oral argument of
Gissel, but it differs from the prior good faith test in several ways.

Gissel deemphasizes the idea of using a bargaining order to punish
employers for unfair labor practices, which was one of the goals of
the good faith test.5 By focusing on the employer's motivation, the
good faith test permitted bargaining orders in situations where a
fair election might well have been held 2 The Gissel test will not
permit bargaining orders in such cases. The opinion suggests that
an employer may have an absolute right to an NLRB election,

absent any unfair labor practices other than the refusal to bargain
itself, though the Court did not explicitly hold this. Taking the
converse of the Gissel test, a bargaining order will not issue when a

fair election is possible; thus an election is practically certain if the
employer commits no unfair labor practices other than the refusal
to bargain. Moreover, the Court relied on the idea that an
employer may have an election if he has committed no serious

misdeeds

3

Thus, it is probable that Gissel may be read to stand for

the proposition that an employer may always refuse a union's

demand to bargain and insist on an election, provided that he
engages in no serious misconduct affecting the election climate."'
The Board, in oral argument, stated two exceptions to this
proposition: where the employer knew from some source other than
L.R.R.M. 1584 (N.L.R.B. 1969): V & H Industries. 71 L.R.R.M. 1549 (N.L.R.B. 1969).
Further, while three courts have allowed the Gissel tests: NLRB v. American Cable Systems,
Inc., 414 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1969); Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 407
(D.C. Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Mink-Dayton, Inc., 72 L.R.R.M. 2232 (6th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
American Art Indus., 72 L.R.R.M. 2199 (5th Cir. 1969); two courts have refused to abandon
thegood faith test: NLRBv. C& P Plaza Dep't Store, 414 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1969); Krystyniak
v. NLRB,71 L.R.R.M. 3135 (3d Cir. 1969).
5 NLRB v. James Thompson & (o.. 208 I-.2d 743. 746 (2d Cir. 1953): Lesnick.
Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election. 65 MIcH. L. Rvv. 851, 855
(1967): 75 YALt: L.J.. supra note 23.
52 Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077. 1079 (1966): Snou & Sons. 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961).
enJorced. 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962): 116 U. l. L. Ri-.. sapra note 28: 75 YA1.1f L.J..
supra note 23. at 812-13.
395 U.S. at 609.
u Three cases since Gissel appear to agree with this interpretation. Mechanical Specialties
Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 414
F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1969); Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 407 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
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the cards themselves that the union had majority support, or where
the employer gave some reason other than doubt of the union's
majority for his refusal.5 However, in the light of Gissel, these
exceptions would appear to be short-lived. While each is relevant to
an inquiry into the "good faith doubt" of an employer, neither is
relevant to an inquiry into the best means of effectuating employee
free choice. Although the upholding of the Cumberland Shoe
doctrine means that fewer cards will be invalidated for solicitor
misrepresentation in some circuits, 6 the probable absolute right to
demand an election reduces the significance of the cards to the
employer, even though he can now be ordered to bargain on the
basis of cards alone. This new emphasis on elections not only
safeguards the worker from employer coercion as before but also
protects him from union misrepresentation and coercion through
the virtual certainty that the employer will obtain a secret ballot
election.
3 See note 37 supra and accompanying text. For examples of reasons other than good
faith doubt of the union's majority status, which employers have given in refusing to
bargain, see note 31 supra and accompanying text.
1 See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.

